The textbook search and matching model suffers from too little amplification and weak internal propagation. We argue that the double failure is due to two negative feedback channels. Intuitively, a decline (rise) in unemployment (vacancies) rises both the wage rate, the "wage channel," and the effective cost to fill a vacancy, the "hiring cost channel." Therefore, we introduce hiring costs and strategic wage bargaining. The interaction between these two modifications limits the impact of both channels effectively and persistently. Thus, the modified model is able to closely match the (inversely) u-shaped impulse responses of vacancies and unemployment.
of vacancies implies that also the model generated response of unemployment is too short-lived, reaching its minimum value already after less than two quarters. This paper argues that the double failure of the textbook search and matching model to replicate the empirical pattern is due to the presence of two negative feedback mechanisms. The first, better-known, mechanism is the "wage channel." Accordingly, the increase in hiring activities after a positive productivity shock raises the worker's outside alternative. Thus, the model generated wage rate "soaks up" most of the shock (Shimer 2005) -which leads to a very muted response in vacancies and unemployment. In addition to that, we show that there is a second mechanism, the "hiring cost channel." When posting a vacancy entails a fixed cost per time unit, the effective cost to fill a vacancy is proportional to the time it takes to find a suitable worker (see also Pissarides 2009 ). However, due to the presence of congestion externalities, the expected time to find a suitable worker rises sharply after a positive productivity shock, and then remains at a high level for a protracted time period. The resulting increase in effective hiring costs reduces the firms' incentives to post vacancies, while the strong persistence of effective hiring costs induces firms to post the bulk of vacancies immediately.
Therefore, we modify the textbook search and matching model in two ways. First, in order to address the "hiring cost channel," we replace the standard linear vacancy posting cost function by hiring costs akin to Gertler and Trigari (2009) . Accordingly, filling a vacancy entails a cost, rather than posting a vacancy (which is costless per se). Second, in order to address the "wage channel," we assume that wages are determined by strategic wage bargaining (Hall and Milgrom 2008) , rather than by the standard Nash (1953) solution. This bargaining protocol limits the impact of aggregate labor market fluctuations on the dynamics of the wage rate.
The interaction between the two modifications is crucial to replicate the long-lived (inversely) u-shaped impulse responses observed in the data. First, the modified hiring cost specification reduces the elasticity and the persistence of the effective cost to fill a vacancy. The reduced elasticity provides firms with incentives to intensify their hiring activities after a positive productivity shock, while the lower degree of persistence gives firms incentives to smooth their hiring activities over several periods. Thus, the modified hiring cost specification creates the necessary conditions to generate a marked hump-shape in vacancies.
3 Second, strategic wage bargaining elicits a moderate but persistent dampening effect on 3 In an independent line of research, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2013) estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model with strategic wage bargaining and hiring costs subject to permanent neutral technology shocks (among other shocks). They find that, in their model, the impact of the two modifications on the responses of vacancies and unemployment is quantitative, not qualitative and quantitative (as in our model). the wage rate. This effect introduces not only a strong amplification mechanism, it also maintains -and even improves -the gradual propagation of shocks in the labor market. Interestingly, we find that the induced amplification is stronger under the modified hiring costs specification than under linear vacancy posting costs. Intuitively, strategic wage bargaining amplifies the supply of vacancies. However, when posting a vacancy is costless, the resulting decline in the vacancy filling rate does not adversely affect the firms' hiring decisions.
In order to illustrate the reinforcing interaction, we also discuss the impulse responses generated by staggered Nash bargaining (Gertler and Trigari 2009) . Under this alternative bargaining protocol, the expected wage paid to newly hired workers responds only little in the first periods after a productivity shock, but then eventually rises. This gives firms incentives to contract new workers immediately. For this reason, the model with staggered Nash bargaining is not able to generate a long-lived hump-shaped response in vacancies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model. Section 2 evaluates the model by matching its impulse responses with those from a structural VAR. Section 3 concludes.
The model
This paper modifies the discrete-time version of the textbook search and matching model (Pissarides 2000) in two ways. First, in order to address the "hiring cost channel", we replace the standard linear vacancy posting cost function by hiring costs akin to Gertler and Trigari (2009) . Second, in order to address the "wage channel", we assume that wages are determined by strategic wage bargaining (Hall and Milgrom 2008) , rather than by the standard Nash solution.
Production
There is a continuum of identical workers in the economy, having unit mass and a continuum of potential firms, having infinite mass. Both firms and workers are risk-neutral and infinitely lived. Production takes place in one-firm-one-worker matches. Workers supply labor inelastically. Each match produces output according to a linear technology. Output per worker, y t , is subject to an exogenous shock specified by the following autoregressive process:
ln( ) (1 )ln( ) ln( ) with ~(0, ) and .
The labor market
At the beginning of period t, the share n t of the labor force is matched with a firm, while the share u t is unemployed and searches for a job in the labor market:
The number of new job matches, m t , is given by a Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant returns to scale:
,
where v t denotes the number of vacancies, χ the efficiency of the matching process, and 0 < α < 1 is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies. By linear homogeneity of the matching function, the aggregate job finding rate, p(θ t ), and the aggregate vacancy filling rate, q(θ t ), depend only on the value of aggregate labor market tightness,
Note that the tighter the labor market, the longer the expected time to fill a vacancy, but the shorter the expected time searching for a job (and vice versa). New job matches, m t , are formed at the end of each period. Simultaneously, a constant share σ of pre-existing employment relationships is terminated. 4 Thus, the law of motion for the employment level, n t , is given by:
The net value of employment to the worker
The value of unemployment to a job searcher is given by:
where b denotes the per-period income during unemployment. In addition, with probability p(θ t ), the job searcher finds a job and becomes employed in the next period. Otherwise, with probability 1-p(θ t ), she remains unemployed. Both the expected value of employment, W t+1 , and the expected value of unemployment, U t+1 , are discounted at the rate β. Analogously, the value of employment to a worker reads as:
where w t denotes the wage rate per period. With probability 1-σ, the worker gains the continuation value of employment. With probability σ, on the contrary, she loses her job at the end of period t and becomes unemployed. Hence, the net value of employment to a worker is:
where the second term denotes the worker's compensation of labor market search; i.e., the sum of the per-period income during unemployment, b, and the option value of finding a job elsewhere. The third term is the continuation value to the worker if the match survives exogenous job destruction.
The net value of employment to the firm
There is a continuum of potential firms on the unit interval j∈ [0, 1] . Each firm can employ at most one worker j. Inactive firms may decide whether or not to hire an unemployed job searcher. Meeting a worker entails a cost, ψ, which is proportional to the aggregate hiring rate, x t = m t /n t , and taken as given by the firm:
This cost function nests quadratic labor adjustment costs, as used by Gertler and Trigari (2009) , in a one-firm-one-worker framework; i.e., the marginal cost to hire an additional worker rises linearly in x t (see also Footnote 6). This specification captures the notion that effective hiring costs are mainly determined by the actual number of hires -rather than by the job advertising and selection process -and that these costs are clearly convex at the aggregate level (Yashiv 2000) .
5
In return, the firm gains the discounted value of a filled position in the next period, J t+1 . Free entry into the labor market ensures that the following nonarbitrage condition holds at any point in time:
The firm receives the value of production, y t , net of the wage rate, w t . With probability σ, the employment relationship is destroyed at the end of the current period. Hence, the net value of employment to the firm is given as:
where the third term is the continuation value to the firm if the match survives exogenous job destruction. 6
Wage determination
At the beginning of every period, after the realization of the aggregate productivity shock, all firm-worker pairs bargain over the wage rate, w t . Hence, at the time of bargaining, the hiring cost is sunk (Christiano et al. 2013) . We assume that the wage rate is determined by a Rubinstein (1982) bargaining game of alternating offers and responses. The respondent may accept the offer, reject it and make a counter-offer, or withdraw completely from the bargaining process. Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) have shown that such a dynamic bargaining process can be represented by a static Nash bargaining game. Accordingly, the wage is set to maximize the following generalized Nash product:
where η represents the firm's relative bargaining power, and X t and Y t denote the worker's and the firm's gain from finding an agreement, respectively. Importantly, as emphasized by Binmore et al. (1986) , the appropriate choice of X t and Y t is determined by the two parties' assessment on the probable reaction of the respondent. Therefore, they distinguish the following two cases: the standard Nash solution and the time-preference Nash solution.
Standard Nash solution If withdrawing from the bargaining process is a credible threat, the two parties' gains from finding an agreement can be identified with the respective value of employment net of the outside alternative:
6 Note that, compared to the original large-firm version (Gertler and Trigari 2009) , the expression 2 ( /2) t x κ is absent, which represents the negative impact of current hiring activities on future hiring costs. Quantitatively, however, the expression is small and, therefore, not important for the dynamics of the model. Further robustness checks following Krause and Lubik (2007) indicate that, under the maintained constant returns to scale assumption, the same conclusion holds true if we allow for intra-firm bargaining (Cahuc, Marque, and Wasmer 2008) .
The resulting wage rate is given as the weighted average of output per worker, y t , and the worker's compensation of labor market search:
where the latter equals the per-period income during unemployment, b, plus the option value of finding a job elsewhere; i.e., the job finding rate, p(θ t ), times the worker's share, (1-η), of the expected present value of a prospective match in the future, κx t /η.
Time-preference Nash solution If, however, the threat to withdraw from the bargaining process is not credible, the threat point is not given by the outside alternative, but by the value of delaying the bargaining process by one period. During this period, which can be interpreted as a strike, we assume that the worker receives income from strike funds, π, and the firm receives a zero profit flow, while both parties retain the continuation value of employment (as in Jung and Kuester 2011) . In this case, X t and Y t are given by:
The resulting wage rate is given as the weighted average of output per worker, y t , and the flow income from strike funds, π:
Strategic wage bargaining In the context of the search and matching model, Hall and Milgrom (2008) argue that the threat to withdraw from the bargaining process is generally not credible. Rather, the presence of the prospective joint surplus gives both parties strong incentives to conclude a wage contract by mutual agreement -it "glues them together," so to speak. Therefore, an unsatisfactory offer is typically rejected and responded to by a counter-offer. On the other hand, the possibility that an unsatisfactory offer leads to the breakdown of the bargaining process is not very likely, but does not disappear completely.
In the following, we account for both possibilities by assuming that the share ω of all firm-worker pairs perceives the risk of bargaining breakdown to be prevalent. These matches engage in standard Nash bargaining. On the other hand, the share 1-ω perceives the risk of bargaining breakdown to be negligible. These matches engage in time-preference Nash bargaining. 7 The risk assessment of each individual firm-worker pair follows an iid process. Therefore, the average wage rate reads as:
This specification nests the standard Nash solution, for ω = 1, and the timepreference Nash solution, for ω = 0, as special cases. As explained by Hall and Milgrom (2008) , the key difference between the standard Nash solution and the time-preference Nash solution is that the worker's compensation of labor market search is clearly pro-cyclical, while the flow income from strike funds is basically a-cyclical. Consequently, the smaller the value of ω, the less elastically the wage rate responds to productivity shocks and, thus, the weaker the negative feedback effect on hiring activities (see also Mortensen and Nagypál 2007) . For this reason, strategic wage bargaining effectively limits the impact of aggregate labor market conditions on the wage rate, but without removing them completely. In equilibrium, note that the parties immediately agree on the unique subgame perfect wage rate (Binmore et al. 1986 ). Thus, a withdraw/strike never happens (Hall and Milgrom 2008) . However, the heterogeneous assessment of risk among firm-worker pairs leads to two inherently different bargaining outcomes.
Staggered Nash bargaining
In order to illustrate the dynamic effects of strategic wage bargaining, we also evaluate our model under staggered Nash bargaining (Gertler and Trigari 2009) . 8 In the spirit of Calvo (1983) , this alternative bargaining protocol assumes that each period only a random fraction, δ, of all firm-worker pairs is able to renegotiate the wage. In this case, the wage is set according to the Nash rule. Newly formed firm-worker pairs that are unable to renegotiate simply adopt the average wage of the previous period. Thus, the non-arbitrage condition under staggered Nash bargaining is given by:
where w t is the average wage at time t, and * 1 t w + is the expected Nash wage in period t+1. Workers in ongoing matches that are unable to renegotiate receive the same wage as in the previous period. Thus, the net values of employment to a worker and a firm who are currently engaged in Nash bargaining are:
where ( )= /(1 ) ( ) .
Given this bargaining structure, the evolution of the average wage is governed by:
(1 ) .
Importantly, Hall (2005) points out that -despite the presence of staggered wage contracts -the formation and separation of firm-worker matches remain jointly efficient as long as X t and Y t are non-negative. Thus, the search and matching model allows for equilibrium wage stickiness. Therefore, Hall concludes that the Barro (1977) critique does not necessarily apply in this class of models.
Decentralized search equilibrium
In our benchmark model with strategic wage bargaining, the decentralized search equilibrium is a set of allocations, {y t , m t , v t , u t , n t }, and the wage rate, w t , such that: Output per worker, y t , follows the exogenous stochastic process (1); the labor force, u t +n t , is normalized to unity (2); the formation of employment relationships, n t , is governed by the matching function (3) and the law of motion for employment (4); the number of new hires, m t , ensures that the non-arbitrage condition (7) holds in conjunction with Equation (8) at any point in time; the average wage rate, w t , is determined by Equation (12); and initial conditions for the state space {y 0 , n 0 } are given.
With staggered Nash bargaining, the non-arbitrage condition (13) and the evolution of the average wage rate (17) are defined accordingly. In addition, the surplus shares of a worker and a firm who are currently engaged in Nash bargaining; i.e., 
Model evaluation
We evaluate our model by matching the model generated impulse responses with those from a structural VAR model. Therefore, we first estimate the dynamic effects of an aggregate productivity shock on vacancies and unemployment using quarterly US data, and then interpolate the responses to a monthly frequency. Second, we calibrate the non-stochastic steady state of our model economy so that one period corresponds to one month, and then log-linearize around it (see Section A.1 in the Appendix). The monthly timing assumption seems a natural choice, given the high speed of labor market adjustment in the US. Our calibration strategy (see below) implies that the steady state of the model economy is independent of the following set of parameters ζ = {α, ρ, ω}. In a third step, the elements in ζ are estimated to minimize the weighted distance between the empirical impulse responses and their model generated counterparts.
Structural vector autoregression

Data, identification and estimation
This section provides empirical evidence on the dynamic effects of an aggregate productivity shock on vacancies and unemployment.
9 Therefore, we consider the following reduced-form VAR:
where y t denotes output per person in the business sector, u t the civilian unemployment rate, and v t the vacancy rate. 10 Our sample period covers US data between 1960Q1 and the start of the Great Recession in 2007Q4. All data are in natural logarithms and are seasonally adjusted. By premultiplying with the contemporaneous coefficient matrix, A 0 , we obtain the structural VAR:
We do not attempt to match the impulse response of the average real wage rate with its model generated counterpart. Due to composition effects, the average real wage rate is substantially less cyclical than individual wages (see, e.g., Solon, Barsky, and Parker 1994 or Lemieux 2006) . 10 Output per person is taken from the BLS (Series ID: PRS84006163), the civilian unemployment rate is taken from FRED (Series ID: UNRATE). The vacancy rate is defined as the ratio between the composite Help Wanted Index (Barnichon 2010 ) and the civilian labor force (FRED Series ID: CLF16OV). Prior to 1995Q1, the composite Help-Wanted index is identical to the original Help-Wanted Advertising Index. As of 1995Q1, the index is adjusted for the increasing importance of online advertising. 11 The description of the structural VAR follows Ravn and Simonelli (2007). where A(L) is a lag polynomial of order M and ε t denotes the vector of fundamental shocks. The orthogonality assumption implies that its covariance matrix V ε = E(ε t′ ε t ) is diagonal. Moreover, we normalize the diagonal of A 0 to a 3 × 1 vector of ones. When estimating the SVAR, we also include constant terms and a linear trend. Following the SC/HQ rule (with M max = 8), the VAR order is set to M = 2. 12 The aggregate productivity shock is identified using a recursive ordering scheme. In particular, we assume that the process of output per worker; i.e., labor productivity, is independent of the current realizations of the other two variables. Hence, the last row of A 0 consists of zeros, apart from the last element which is normalized to unity. This short-run restriction implements the notion of exogenous productivity shocks. Figure 1 illustrates the Cholesky orthogonalized impulse responses to a one standard deviation aggregate productivity shock. We generate the responses for 16 quarters and then interpolate the series to 45 monthly observation points. The black solid line is the point estimate. The dark (light) gray area represents the associated 66% (90%) confidence interval. We find that the aggregate productivity shock triggers a sudden increase in labor productivity by about 0.8%. The effects of this shock are very persistent. In particular, we observe that the response of labor productivity is positively significant for the entire time horizon. The rise in labor productivity causes a protracted u-shaped decline in the unemployment rate, reaching its minimum, -2.9%, 12 months after the technological innovation. The impulse response function remains significant at the 90% 12 The shape of the impulse responses is robust across various specifications. In particular, we obtain very similar results when we estimate the VAR without a linear trend and output per worker in first differences. Table ( 2) additionally shows the estimated parameters of our model when the VAR order is set to M = 3.
Empirical impulse responses
level for nearly three years. The vacancy response, on the other hand, is almost identical to the unemployment response -albeit with a positive sign. The peak response of vacancies is equal to 3.4%. The sluggish response of vacancies and unemployment is consistent with previous estimates by Blanchard and Diamond (1989) , Fujita and Ramey (2007) , Ravn and Simonelli (2007) , Braun et al. (2009), and Fujita (2011) .
Model calibration
Timing, preferences and technology As mentioned above, we calibrate the model so that one period corresponds to one month (see Table 1 ). The discount factor, β = 0.9967, is chosen to match an annual real interest rate of 4%. Besides, we normalize the steady state level of output per worker, y t , to unity. (2012), we set the steady-state job separation rate, σ, equal to 3.4% per month and target an average job finding rate, ( ), p θ equal to 44%. The average unemployment rate, , u consistent with the underlying labor market transition rates is equal to 7.2%.
Search in the labor market Following Shimer
For firm-worker matches who engage in standard Nash bargaining, the targeted average job finding rate is given as: 
where we have made use of the non-arbitrage condition (7), the value of employment to the firm (8), the wage equation (10), and the steady state relationship . x σ = Equation (18) shows that the target, ( ) 0.44, p θ = can be matched by choosing different combinations of unemployment benefits, b, the firm's bargaining power, η, and the hiring cost parameter, κ. We identify the appropriate combination using the following two additional targets. First, we match the estimate of Costain and Reiter (2008) on the long-run semi-elasticity of unemployment with respect to unemployment benefits, 2.
u b ε = Second, we match the estimate of Merz and Yashiv (2007, p. 1427) on the asset value of a new hire to the firm, 1.48. x J κ β = = Therefore, we choose the combination b = 0.44, η = 0.58, and κ = 43.38. The implied total average cost of the hiring process corresponds to 4.9% of the average wage rate; i.e., a value close to the one obtained by Silva and Toledo (2009) . As the search and matching model allows for a further normalization (Shimer 2005) , we set θ to unity, which implies ( ) 0.44 q θ = and χ = 0.44. For firm-worker matches who engage in time-preference Nash bargaining, we target the same steady state wage rate, 0.94, w = as under standard Nash bargaining. This requires to set the flow income from strike funds, π, equal to the worker's compensation of labor market search in the steady state:
This calibration strategy ensures that the steady state of our model economy is independent of the estimated value for ω.
Estimation strategy
Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) , we estimate the elements in ζ to minimize the weighted distance between the model generated impulse responses, Γ(ζ), and their empirical counterparts, Γ:
where Ψ is a diagonal matrix with the sample variances of the empirical impulse responses along the diagonal (see also Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005) . The standard deviation of the stochastic process (specified by Equation 1), σ ε , is chosen to match the empirical impact response of output per worker, which is normalized to unity for illustrative purposes.
Estimation results
We now evaluate the performance of our benchmark model with strategic wage bargaining (Hall and Milgrom 2008) and hiring costs (akin to Gertler and Trigari 2009) in generating long-lived (inversely) u-shaped impulse responses in vacancies and unemployment. Both modifications have in common that they reduce the impact of current labor market conditions on the model's dynamics. Strategic wage bargaining by isolating the dynamics of the wage rate from the fluctuations in the aggregate labor market; i.e., the "wage channel". The alternative hiring cost specification by removing the direct impact of labor market tightness on the effective cost to fill a vacancy; i.e., the "hiring cost channel". In order to disentangle the effects of the two modifications, we first evaluate the estimated benchmark model and then compare the impulse responses with alternative model specifications. Table 2 summarizes the estimated parameters and Figure 2A depicts the corresponding impulse responses (black solid line), as well as their empirical counterparts. The estimate for the autoregressive parameter of the stochastic process, ρ = 0.973, ensures that the model generated time path of labor productivity remains within the 66% confidence interval for the entire time period. The degree of autocorrelation is very close to other estimates found in the literature (see, e.g., Fujita and Ramey 2007) . Moreover, we observe that our model is able to generate (inversely) u-shaped responses in vacancies and unemployment, reaching their turning points after about one year -as in the data. Thus, both estimated responses lie within the 66% confidence interval for most of the obser- vation period. The tracking performance is particularly good at forecast horizons between 8 and 32 months. The estimated value of the matching elasticity of vacancies, α = 0.50, is within the interval [0.3, 0.5] proposed by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) . The estimated share of firm-worker pairs engaged in standard Nash bargaining, ω = 0.35, is discussed below.
Estimated benchmark model
The wage channel
In order to illustrate the wage channel, Figure ( 2A) compares the impulse responses of the estimated benchmark model (black solid line) with the corresponding impulse responses when the share of firm-worker pairs engaged in Nash bargaining, ω, is set to unity (black dashed line). All other parameters are kept fixed. We observe that, in the latter case, the impulse responses of vacancies and unemployment are much less volatile. This observation, popularized by Shimer (2005), is known as the "unemployment volatility puzzle" (Pissarides 2009 ). By implication, this means that strategic wage bargaining provides a powerful tool to amplify labor market fluctuations. Moreover, we find that strategic wage bargaining introduces not only a strong amplification mechanism, it also maintains -and even improves -the gradual propagation of shocks in the labor market. This becomes evident from Figure (2B) , where we compare the impulse responses of our estimated benchmark model (black solid line) with those generated by the model with staggered Nash bargaining.
14 All other parameters set equal, the estimated Calvo wage stickiness parameter to minimize the expression in Equation (19) is equal to δ = 0.77 (see Table 2 ). When we use this estimate (black dashed line), the model is not able to generate a hump-shape in vacancies. When we set δ = 0.89 (black dotted line), as in Gertler and Trigari (2009) , the model generates a short-lived hump in vacancies, but the initial response is too strong. To sum up, only the estimated benchmark model with strategic wage bargaining is able to replicate the long-lived hump-shaped vacancy response observed in the data.
In order to investigate the role of the wage bargaining mechanism for the dynamic behavior of the labor market, Figure 3 presents the impulse responses of the wage rate under three different wage setting rules. Under staggered Nash bargaining (black dotted line), the expected wage paid to newly hired workers responds only little in the first periods after an aggregate productivity shock. In the following periods, we observe a hump-shaped pattern, with peak effects occurring after about one year. Given that staggered wage contracts have an expected duration of several months, this pattern gives firms strong incentives to contract new workers before the expected wage eventually rises. As a result, most of the firms hire new workers immediately after the innovation. This explains why the model with staggered Nash bargaining (see also Gertler and Trigari 2009 ) is unable to generate a long-lived hump-shaped vacancy response. Strategic wage bargaining (black solid line), by contrast, dampens the elasticity of the Nash wage (black dashed line) much less in the first periods after an aggregate productivity shock. 15 However, the dampening effect is very persistent. Hence, at medium and long horizons, we note that the expected elasticity of the wage is much lower than under staggered Nash bargaining. Given that the average firmworker match lasts for about 30 months, forward-looking firms take into account the expected present value of current and future wage payments when hiring a worker.
16 Consequently, the long-lasting dampening effect generated by strategic wage bargaining gives forward-looking firms strong incentives to amplify job creation after an aggregate productivity shock. Furthermore, we note that wages 15 To be precise, the black dashed line represents the response of the Nash wage under staggered Nash bargaining; i.e., the wage paid to workers in matches that are able to renegotiate. The black solid line represents the hypothetical response under strategic wage bargaining; i.e., the wage implied by Equation (12), given the same aggregate fluctuations as under staggered Nash bargaining. 16 See Shimer (2004) , who discusses the argument developed by Boldrin and Horvath (1995) in the context of a search and matching model. under strategic wage bargaining are negotiated each period. Thus, unlike in the case of staggered wage contracts, firms are not particularly encouraged to hire new workers immediately after the innovation. For this reason, strategic wage bargaining maintains -and even improves -the gradual propagation of shocks in the labor market (see Figure 2A) . The dynamics generated by our estimated benchmark model are consistent with the conclusion by Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2012) , who find little evidence for staggered wage setting rules that prevent wage adjustment from occurring. Furthermore, the same authors show that the search and matching model is able to amplify labor market volatility if the productivity elasticity of the wage is close but somewhat below one. Indeed, using CPS data, they estimate that the elasticity of wages of new hires from non-employment with respect to aggregate productivity is equal to 0.79.
w y ε = 17 Based on a simulation exercise, Haefke et al. (2012) argue that this measure is a good observable proxy for the cyclicality of the expected present value of wage payments at the start of the match -the relevant empirical target for the cyclicality of the wage rate in a model with longterm employment relationships. The corresponding elasticity of the wage rate in our estimated benchmark model, 0.70, w y ε = is not significantly different from their baseline estimate; and it is exactly identical to their estimate for workers between 30 and 45 years. Thus, our estimated benchmark model is not only able to match the empirical impulse responses of vacancies and unemployment, also the underlying moderate degree of wage rigidity seems to be in line with the data. Haefke et al. (2012) , however, argue that for a standard model without on-the-job search the elasticity of wages of new hires from non-employment is the relevant empirical target. 18 Kudlyak (2013) develops a very similar theoretical argument as Haefke et al. (2012) . However, using panel data from the NLSY, she estimates that the productivity elasticity of the expected present value of wage payments at the start of the match is even larger than one. Based on this estimate, she concludes that the unemployment volatility puzzle cannot be solved by wage formation. 19 See Section (A.3) in the Appendix for the log-linearized version of the model.
(dashed solid line). The fixed cost to post a vacancy is re-calibrated to κ* = 0.6662 per period (see Table 1 ). This ensures that the steady state of both model versions is identical. Also note that the set of parameters ζ is not re-estimated. Instead, we adopt the values estimated above; i.e., ρ = 0.973, η = 0.50, ω = 0.35 in order to facilitate comparison between the different model specifications.
The most striking difference between Figure (2A) and (2C) is that the model with linear vacancy posting costs is unable to generate a hump-shaped response in vacancies. Rather, vacancies initially overshoot and then very quickly fall back to normal levels. The counterfactual response of vacancies implies that also the model generated response of unemployment is too short-lived, reaching its minimum value already after less than two quarters. To understand the counterfactual dynamics, recall that, in the textbook model (Pissarides 2000) , posting a vacancy entails a fixed cost per time unit. Thus, the effective cost to fill a vacancy is proportional to the time it takes to find a suitable worker. Due to the presence of congestion externalities, the expected time to fill a vacancy; i.e., the inverse of the vacancy filling rate, rises sharply after a positive productivity shock, and then remains at a high level for a protracted time period (see Figure 4A) . Hence, firms find it optimal to post the bulk of vacancies immediately.
In contrast, our benchmark model assumes that filling a vacancy entails a cost, rather than posting a vacancy. Now the effective cost to hire an additional worker is determined by the aggregate hiring rate. 20 This modification substantially dampens the negative feedback effect of congestion externalities. 
20
The proportionality assumption between effective hiring costs and labor market tightness has also been questioned by Pissarides (2009) . Instead, he suggests to introduce a fixed matching cost in addition to the vacancy posting cost.
shows that the hiring rate rises only moderately and then quickly converges to its steady state value -even if labor market tightness is very volatile. This effect has two interesting consequences. First, the low elasticity of the aggregate hiring rate provides firms with incentives to hire more workers after an aggregate productivity shock. For this reason, we observe that -even if wages are determined by standard Nash bargaining -the amplitude of the unemployment response is substantially larger than under standard linear vacancy posting costs. 21 Second, the expected decline in the near future gives firms strong incentives to smooth their hiring activities over several periods. At the same time, unemployment -the second input factor besides vacancies in the matching function -is declining. As a result, in the first year after an aggregate technology shock, firms have to post an increasing number of (per se costless) vacancies in order to maintain a steady flow of new hires. Consequently, our benchmark model has the potential to generate the required long-lived hump-shape in vacancies and, thus, a sufficiently long-lived u-shaped response of unemployment.
Interaction effects between the modifications
The interaction between the two modifications is crucial to replicate the longlived (inversely) u-shaped impulse responses observed in the data. First, the modified hiring cost specification reduces the elasticity and the persistence of the effective cost to fill a vacancy. The reduced elasticity provides firms with incentives to intensify their hiring activities after a positive productivity shock, while the lower degree of persistence gives firms incentives to smooth their hiring activities over several periods. Thus, the modified hiring cost specification creates the necessary conditions to generate a marked hump-shape in vacancies. Second, strategic wage bargaining elicits a moderate but persistent dampening effect on the wage rate. This effect introduces not only a strong amplification mechanism, it also maintains -and even improves -the gradual propagation of shocks in the labor market.
Interestingly, we find that the induced amplification is stronger under the modified hiring cost specification than under linear vacancy posting costs (see Figure 2C ). Intuitively, strategic wage bargaining amplifies the supply of vacancies. In the standard model, the resulting decline in the vacancy filling rate (i) increases the effective hiring cost and (ii) raises the wage rate through an increase in the value of alternative employment opportunities. Both channels exert a 21 Note that this effect is reinforced by the fact that the lower elasticity of the effective hiring cost dampens the elasticity of the wage rate, too (see Section 2.4.4). negative feedback effect on firms' hiring activities. However, when vacancies are costless, the (inverse of the) vacancy filling rate does not adversely affect firms' hiring decisions. Instead, the corresponding variable in our estimated benchmark model is the (less responsive) hiring rate x t (see Equations 7 and 12). Thus, the modified hiring cost specification effectively limits the impact of both negative feedback effects. This result is also confirmed by our estimate for ω = 0.35, which implies that each period more than one third of all firm-worker pairs are engaged in Nash bargaining. Put differently, the impact of aggregate labor market fluctuations is not removed completely but remains partially. By contrast, the corresponding value chosen by Hall and Milgrom (2008) to match the empirical volatility of unemployment is less than half the size of our estimate. Thus, in a model with linear vacancy posting costs, the wage needs to be more strictly isolated from aggregate labor market conditions to generate the same amount of unemployment volatility.
Our finding that the two modifications reinforce each other seems new to the literature. Yashiv (2006) , on the other hand, evaluates the performance of an alternative cost function with hiring and vacancy posting cost. He finds that this specification generates more persistence, but also less volatility in the labor market. This result suggests that there is an inherent trade-off between volatility and persistence. This trade-off, however, is not present in our model because, when posting a vacancy is costless, the decline in the vacancy filling rate does not exert a negative feedback effect.
Comparison with Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)
Finally, we investigate the relationship between strategic wage bargaining and the approach of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) . The authors argue that a re-calibrated textbook model with standard Nash bargaining is able to match the amount of labor market volatility observed in the data. In particular, they choose high values for unemployment benefits, b, and the firm's bargaining power, η. This implies that the dynamics of the wage rate are mainly determined by b -which is constant (see Equation 10). Consequently, this calibration strategy isolates the dynamics of the wage rate largely from the fluctuations of the aggregate labor market -similarly to our benchmark model. All other parameters set equal (but ω = 1), the estimated values to minimize the weighted distance between the empirical impulse responses and their model generated counterparts are as follows: b = 0.76, η = 0.79. Importantly, we note that this parameter combination is consistent with our calibration target ( ) 0.44 p θ = (see Equation 18 ).
The resulting impulse responses of vacancies and unemployment are depicted in Figure (2D) . Strikingly, the impulse responses are virtually identical. However, there is one key difference between the approach of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and our benchmark model. Everything else being equal, the former predicts a very high long-run semi-elasticity of unemployment with respect to unemployment benefits, 5.2, u b ε = while our benchmark model is consistent with the empirical estimate by Costain and Reiter, (2008, 2 u b ε = ). In addition, Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2011) have shown that search and matching models with a high value of non-market time, b, are not consistent with the degree of frictional wage dispersion observed in the data. Our benchmark model thus shows that a high value of b is not necessarily needed to amplify the fluctuations in the labor market.
Conclusion
The textbook search and matching model suffers from too little amplification and weak internal propagation. This paper argues that the double failure is due to the presence of two negative feedback mechanisms. Intuitively, a decline (rise) in unemployment (vacancies) rises both the wage rate and the effective cost to fill a vacancy. Therefore, we modify the textbook search and matching model in two ways. First, in order to address the "hiring cost channel," we replace the standard linear vacancy posting cost function by hiring costs akin to Gertler and Trigari (2009) . Second, in order to address the "wage channel," we assume that wages are determined by strategic wage bargaining (Hall and Milgrom 2008) , rather than by the standard Nash solution.
We show that the interaction between the two modifications is crucial to replicate the long-lived (inversely) u-shaped impulse responses observed in the data. First, the modified hiring cost specification reduces the elasticity and the persistence of the effective cost to fill a vacancy. The reduced elasticity provides firms with incentives to intensify their hiring activities after a positive productivity shock, while the lower degree of persistence gives firms incentives to smooth their hiring activities over several periods. Thus, the modified hiring cost specification creates the necessary conditions to generate a marked hump-shape in vacancies. Second, strategic wage bargaining elicits a moderate but persistent dampening effect on the wage rate. This effect introduces not only a strong amplification mechanism, it also maintains -and even improves -the gradual propagation of shocks in the labor market. Interestingly, we find that the induced amplification is stronger under the modified hiring costs specification than under linear vacancy posting costs. Intuitively, strategic wage bargaining amplifies the supply of vacancies. However, when posting a vacancy is costless, the resulting decline in the vacancy filling rate does not adversely affect the firms' hiring decisions.
In order to illustrate the reinforcing interaction, we also discuss the impulse responses generated by staggered Nash bargaining (Gertler and Trigari 2009) . Under this alternative bargaining protocol, the expected wage paid to newly hired workers responds only little in the first periods after a productivity shock, but then eventually rises. This gives firms incentives to contract new workers immediately. For this reason, the model with staggered Nash bargaining is not able to generate a long-lived hump-shaped response in vacancies. 
